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ABSTRACT 
The Kingdom of Cambodia has recently begun to provide Royal Cambodian Armed 
Forces personnel to United Nations-led peacekeeping operations in Africa, and the 
Middle East. This thesis draws on systemic, regional, and domestic level theories for why 
states contribute to international organizations in an attempt to explain participation in 
peacekeeping abroad.  It argues that Cambodia’s political and military elite promote 
peacekeeping as a means of inexpensively affecting military reform. This thesis will also 
provide a comparative case study of the Republic of Indonesia. The Southeast Asian 
nation has significantly increased the number of personnel it provides to United Nations 
peacekeeping missions, from a few hundred in early 2001 to nearly eighteen hundred 
personnel in mid-2011.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
“With over 116,000 deployed personnel across 15 missions, the scale of 
peacekeeping today is unprecedented,” states the United Nations report “A New 
Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.”1 The report 
continues, “UN peacekeeping cannot rely heavily on a small number of significant 
contributors. An expanded base of troop- and police-contributing countries is required to 
enhance collective burden-sharing and to meet future requirements.”2 Nations such as 
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh can no longer bear the bulk of the peacekeeping burden.  
Increasingly, Southeast Asian nations are provided a greater number of troops to 
United Nations-led peacekeeping operations. In October 2004, less than 800 personnel 
from three Southeast Asian nations (i.e., The Republic of the Philippines, The Republic 
of Indonesia, and Malaysia) were deployed as United Nations peacekeepers. By July 
2011, over 4,700 personnel from seven Southeast Asian nations were actively 
participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations.  Some nations, such as the 
Republic of Thailand, resumed their participation after a lengthy hiatus; some nations, 
such as the Kingdom of Cambodia, deployed peacekeepers for the first time.     
Since 2005, the Kingdom of Cambodia has provided on average over 145 
peacekeepers each year to a multitude of UN missions, including the United Nations 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) / United Nations Mission in Southern Sudan (UNMISS), and 
the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT).3 
Additional engineers were deployed in late 2010 in support of the United Nations Interim 
                                                 
1“A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,” last modified July 
2009. Available online at:  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf, accessed 
November 1, 2010.  
2 Ibid.  
3 “Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Police Personnel,” last modified August 31, 
2010. Available online at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors, accessed September 16, 2010.  
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Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).4 The majority of these peacekeepers have been field 
engineers, responsible for demining and unexploded ordinance disposal.  
This thesis will address the following question: What are the Kingdom of 
Cambodia’s motives for contributing an increasing number of troops to United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations (UN-PKO)? This thesis will attempt to answer the question by 
conducting a brief historical analysis of the employment of the Cambodian armed forces 
from independence till the modern era. Additionally, this thesis will briefly examine the 
employment of another military force in the region, one which is steadily increasing its 
participation in UN-PKO—the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) of the Republic of 
Indonesia. By determining potential motives for the Republic of Indonesia’s participation 
in UN-PKO it may be possible to establish a more general trend present across a larger 
number of Southeast Asian nation-states.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Modern peacekeeping operations bear little resemblance to the peacekeeping 
operations of the past. Regarding the immediate post-Cold War era, Michael Lipson 
writes, “[United Nations] Missions were deployed to settings that were considered 
unsuitable for peacekeeping under the traditional principles of peacekeeping formulated 
during the Cold War.”5 Lipson refers to the early 1990s, when relative gains in the peace 
dividend were made in Cambodia, but were then almost immediately off-set by setbacks 
in Bosnia and Somalia. Lipson continues, “Peacekeepers were sent to intrastate conflicts 
and the traditional peacekeeping principles of consent, neutrality, and the limited use of 
force were stretched.”6 As Marrack Goulding writes, “In political, legal and military 
terms, and in terms of the survival of one’s own troops, there is, on the one hand, all the 
difference in the world between being deployed with the consent and cooperation of the 
                                                 
4 “Cambodia to Dispatch Peacekeepers to Lebanon Next Week,” last modified June 23, 2010. 
Available online at:  http://www.un.int/cambodia/Bulletin_Files/June10/Cambodia_to_[-]dispatch.pdf, 
accessed September 15, 2010.  
5 Michael Lipson, “A ‘Garbage Can’ Model of UN Peacekeeping,” Global Governance 13 (Jan–Mar 
2007), 79.  
6 Lipson, “A ‘Garbage Can’ Model of UN Peacekeeping,” 79.  
 3 
parties…and, on the other hand, being deployed without their consent and with powers to 
use force to compel them to accept the decisions of the security council.”7 
The mounting need for peace enforcement operations, authorized by the United 
Nations Security Council primarily in order to bring resolution to intrastate conflict, has 
caused United Nations member-states to reevaluate their motives for sending 
peacekeepers in harm’s way.  An analysis of way some member-states are not only 
actively participating in multiple peace enforcement operations, but also increasing the 
number of peacekeepers they send abroad, may aid in overcoming participation 
shortfalls.  
C. HYPOTHESES 
What motives might the Royal Government of Cambodia (RCG) have for 
authorizing troops to participate in a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation?  
Hypothesis 1: The RCG authorizes peacekeeping in order to conform to 
expectations of nation-state behavior.  
The first hypothesis argues that the existing international system significantly influences, 
but not necessarily dictates, nation-state behavior. In essence, peacekeeping is simply the 
right the thing to do because the international system says it is so.  
Hypothesis 2: The RCG promotes peacekeeping as a means of improving their 
position in regional and international organizations.  
The second hypothesis posits that the RCG uses peacekeeping as a means demonstrating 
its commitment to the international system, thereby improving its image and / or position.    
Hypothesis 3: The RCG looks to peacekeeping as a means of affecting military 
reform.  
                                                 
7 Marrack Goulding, “The Evolution of International Peacekeeping,” International Affairs 69 (Jul. 
1993): 461.  
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Regarding the final hypothesis, the international system is still important; however, 
domestic incentives for military reform outweigh the RCG’s need to either conform to, or 
transform, regional and international organizations.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Michael Brown writes, “In the complex, increasingly interconnected world of the 
twenty-first century, multilateralism will not only be an option—it will be a necessity.”8 
Traditional explanations of nation-state behavior no longer apply in the modern world. 
State motives increasingly go beyond fundamentally realist balance-of-power, neorealist 
security, or liberal interdependence explanations. Increasingly, states are required to act 
in ways that allow them to either mitigate or negate previously undefined threats to 
national interests; these threats include, but are not limited to, transnational terrorism, 
pandemic and endemic diseases, and even global climate change.  
Over the last decade, scholars have begun to craft new explanations for nation-
state behavior, which often borrow concepts from one or more international relations 
theories.  Furthermore, thanks to the growing transparency of the modern world, scholars 
are able to examine state motives at the systemic, regional, and domestic level. The 
following review of current literature regarding state motives for participation in 
multilateral, international operations will help to identity salient theoretical features. 
 1.  Systemic Explanations 
The complexity of modern international politics has mandated the creation of 
mechanisms which facilitate state cooperation and coordination. Robert Jervis maintains 
that states are increasingly becoming more transparent in their behavior in order to 
accommodate mutually supporting interests.9 The behavior of one state must be 
examined in the light of other states’ behaviors. Seth Weinberger goes on to explain the 
concept of “Institutional Signaling”: 
                                                 
8 Michael E. Brown, “New Global Dangers,” in Leashing the Dogs of War, ed. Chester A. Crocker et. 
al. (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 40.   
9 Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International 
Security 24 (Summer, 1999): 51.  
 5 
Institutions, by virtue of their ability to impose costs on states as a result 
of compliance with the rules and obligations, provide a means of 
generating signals that will be accepted as credible by the policymakers of 
a given state. Those signals will be interpreted as revealing vital 
information about the true nature and interests of other states. Only if they 
have ways of sending and reading such signals can two states escape the 
pressures of the security dilemma and begin moving toward a cooperative 
relationship.10 
Weinberger explains that states are compelled to indicate the true intent of their behavior 
due to the various constraints imposed on them by the international political system. 
However, some scholars maintain that states are simultaneously restricted and 
emboldened by the existing structure of international politics. 
Scholars, such as Martha Finnemore, write that the structure of international 
politics is defined by internationally recognized norms and values.11 Finnemore writes, 
“The social nature of international politics creates normative understandings among 
actors that, in turn, coordinate values, expectations, and behavior.”12  Finnemore goes on 
to explain that the increasing likelihood of states to participate in multilateral 
humanitarian interventions is a direct reflection of the salience of internationally accepted 
norms in the political decision making process. Finnemore continues, “Multilateral norms 
create political benefits for conformance and costs for nonconforming action. They 
create, in part, the structure of incentives facing states.”13 States are likely to define 
themselves, and be defined by others, in terms of either how much, or how little, they 
adhere to the published norms of the international community.  
Today, states are defined in terms of their acceptance of predominately-Western 
democratic ideals. Marina Ottaway writes, “It has become axiomatic that democracy is 
                                                 
10 Seth Weinberger, “Institutional Signaling and the Origins of the Cold War,” Security Studies 12 
(2003): 81.  
11 Internationally accepted norms are best delineated by former-United Nations Secretary General 
Kofi Annan’s “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,” available 
online at: http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm, accessed January 14, 2011.  
12 Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in The Culture of National 
Security, ed. John G. Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 157.  
13 Ibid., 183.  
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the only acceptable political system, good for all countries under all circumstances. As a 
result, democracy promotion has become an important component of the relationship 
between the so-called international community–in practice the rich industrial 
democracies and the multilateral institutions they dominate–and the rest of the world.”14  
This sentiment is echoed by Oliver Ramsbotham, who writes, “The harsh actuality of 
international politics [is] that, when it comes to full-scale international interventions, it is 
only the powerful who intervene in the affairs of the weak, not the other way round.”15 
However, Ramsbotham fails to recognize the contribution of developing nations to both 
peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HADR) operations.  
Ideally, democratic states “share norms, enjoy a particular standing within the 
international community, and converge in terms of policies and strategies to solve world 
problems.”16 Inherently cooperative, democratic nations gain relative security through the 
active promotion of accepted norms in the international community.17 A study conducted 
by D.C.F. Daniel and Leigh C. Caraher in 2006 found that the majority of nations 
contributing troops to UN-PKO were “democratic, middle income or rich, stable, and 
lesser or highly developed.”18 However, relatively non-democratic nations are beginning 
to contribute significant numbers of troops to United Nations peacekeeping missions 
abroad. Arturo Sotomayor writes,  
Numerous democratizing regimes, some of which are still facing 
authoritarian legacies, are going beyond the call of duty in supplying 
troops. Moreover, some [troop lending countries] have authoritarian 
                                                 
14 Marina Ottaway, “Is Democracy the Answer,” in Leashing the Dogs of War, ed. Chester A. Crocker 
et. al. (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 603.  
15 Oliver Ramsbotham, “The Ethics of Intervention,” in Contemporary Conflict Resolution, ed. Oliver 
Ramsbotham et. al. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 286.  
16 Arturo C. Sotomayor Velazquez, “Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While 
Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America’s Contributions to 
Peacekeeping Operations,” Security Studies 19 (February 2010): 170.  Andreas Andersson, “United Nations 
Intervention by United Democracies? State Commitment to UN Interventions,” Cooperation and Conflict: 
Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 37 (December  2002): 363–386.  
17 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is…And Is Not,” in Essential 
Readings in Comparative Politics , eds. Patrick H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Co., 2010), 153.  
18 D.C.F. Daniel and Leigh C. Caraher, “Characteristics of Troop Contributors to Peace Operations 
and Implications for Global Capacity,” International Politics 13 (September 2006): 308.   
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regimes, and while the peace explanation claims to be probabilistic and 
not deterministic, the fact that major troop suppliers remain nondemocratic 
needs to be explained rather than assumed or simply treated as outliers.19  
If decidedly non-democratic states nonetheless contribute to multilateral operations, what 
other possible explanations exist for their behavior? 
2. Regional Explanations 
Kai He writes:  
Built on neorealism’s balance of power theory in conjunction with insights 
from neoliberalism’s interdependence theory and integrated via Joseph 
Grieco’s ‘voice opportunity’ hypothesis, the institutional balancing model 
identifies the mechanism of ‘institutional balancing,’ i.e., to counter 
pressures or threats through initiating, utilizing, and dominating 
multilateral institutions, as an overlooked realist strategy for states to 
pursue security under anarchy.20  
Regarding Grieco’s “voice opportunity” hypothesis, Kai He provides the following 
summary and subsequent modification:  
Weak but influential states treat institutions as a means to constrain strong 
states and to increase their weight in regional decision-making. The 
institutional realist model modifies the key assumption of the ‘voice 
opportunity’ hypothesis by introducing another systemic variable—
interdependence—to specify when and why weak states can successfully 
use institutions as a means of pursuing their security. In addition, the 
institutional balancing model expands the application of the ‘voice 
opportunity’ hypothesis from economic cooperation to security issues.21 
Similar to Weinberger’s “Institutional Signaling,” Kai He’s “Institutional Balancing” is a 
mechanism for states in general, and developing states in particular, to assure security 
through multilateral cooperation in the broader context of international politics. Nations 
are more likely to cooperate with other nations of similar economic conditions, cultural 
background, or shared borders, rather than like democratic ideals. 
                                                 
19 Sotomayor, “Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not,” 171. 
20 Kai He, “Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory,” 492.  
21 Ibid., 512–513.  
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Identified shortly after the inception of the United Nations, those states not 
belonging to the “Big Five” (i.e., The United States, The United Kingdom, China, Russia, 
and France) but, when considered in aggregate, may possess enough political power to 
influence the decision making process of the United Nations Security Council, are 
deemed to be “middle powers.”22 “Middle powers” are able to collectively maintain the 
status quo, and therefore able to “protect and preserve” their national interests through a 
unity-of-effort. Furthermore, “middle powers” are assumed to value socio-political 
discourse above brutish military intervention. Arturo Sotomayor writes, “Middle powers 
are said to pursue multilateral solutions, [be] facilitators in building coalitions, managers 
in their own regions, and promoters/enforcers of international norms.”23 “Middle power” 
theorists purport that their unique collective identity makes them exceptionally adept at 
peacekeeping, and qualifies them for recognition in the UN decision making process.24 
However, Sotomayor points out that not all “middle power” states behave the same 
way.25 Furthermore, “middle power” practice is not congruent with respective rhetoric.  
Sotomayor writes, “Since 2000, a large number of small and weak states, not identified or 
classified as middle powers, are bearing the heaviest burdens.”26 If non-democratic 
nations are unexpectedly increasing the number of troops they provide to United Nations 
Peacekeeping operations, while at the same time “Middle Power” nations are taking a 
noted step back, what other factors seem to influence state behavior? 
3. Domestic Explanations    
Laura Neack states, “In terms of who participates and how they participate, in 
terms of where peace-keeping operations get launched, in terms of the impressions of 
                                                 
22 Sotomayor, “Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not,” 169. 
23 Sotomayor, “Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not,” 169.  
24 This argument is eerily similar to that made by “Democratic Peace Theory” proponents.   
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 170.  
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peace-keepers and observers, states participate in peace-keeping to serve their own 
interests.”27  
Neack concludes:  
The realist explanation of state participation in UN peace-keeping is that 
states do whatever they can, given their power resources, to protect and 
preserve their national interests. If national leaders see their states’ 
interests inexorably linked to the continuation of the international status 
quo, they will support and defend the status quo.28  
Neack argues that states behave according to their own self-interests. Therefore, domestic 
concerns take precedence over international challenges to accepted norms of behavior. 
States are unlikely to participate in multilateral peacekeeping operations unless certain 
conditions are met at home.  
State interests are shaped by civil-military and bureaucratic considerations.29 
Furthermore, according to Sotomayor,  
Variations in terms of commitments can be explained in terms of security 
doctrines and integration of military and foreign policy roles. Countries 
with externally oriented doctrines and integrated foreign and defense 
policies are more likely to commit troops to the UN than countries with 
national security doctrines and segregated military and foreign policy 
roles.30 
Sotomayor goes on to show that participation is not strictly limited countries with 
externally oriented doctrines; countries with either mixed military doctrine, or countries 
transitioning from any another orientation towards an externally oriented military 
doctrine, may choose to participate in UNPKO, albeit in a limited capacity. Sotomayor 
writes, “[Peacekeeping] can provide a means to transit from one doctrine to another 
                                                 
27 Laura Neack, “UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interests of Community or Self,” Journal of Peace 
Research 32 (May 1995): 194.   
28 Neack, “UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interests of Community or Self,” 184.  
29 Sotomayor, “Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not,” 162. 
30 Ibid.  
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without provoking large budgetary and operational cuts—justifying some levels of 
expenditure at a time when immanent internal security threats are eroding.”31  
4. In Summary    
Doug Lieb writes:  
On balance, the truth lies between the extremes [realism and liberalism]. 
Supposing that leaders who author foreign policy have absolutely no stake 
in the politics of their nations is as impractical as supposing that they are 
so preoccupied with those politics as to develop strategy without giving 
any thought to external conditions. It is similarly difficult to conceive of 
major global institution as having either no effect at all upon leaders’ 
thought processes or as compelling leaders to take action that runs counter 
to their national interests.32  
Increasingly, states are compelled to interact in the global commons. Therefore, decisions 
are tempered by universally accepted norms of state behavior. Furthermore, as rapid 
advances in technology facilitate cultural exchange and economic interdependence, as 
well as the salience of transnational actors, developing nation-states will continue to 
cement regional and international partnerships in order to mitigate external security 
threats and internal instability. Additionally, the growing role of transnational actors will 
require refined civil-military relations in order to inscribe foreign and domestic policies 
which concurrently stem transnational threats and maintain state sovereignty.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will primarily be a comparative, historical analysis of the employment 
primarily of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), but also the Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia (TNI). Secondary sources will provide the lion’s share of historical 
background, while primary sources will allow for more in-depth analysis of current 
RCAF and TNI activities, to include peacekeeping.  
                                                 
31 Sotomayor, “Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not,” 177.  
32 Lieb is referring to military leaders, and not politicians. Doug Lieb, “The Limits of  Neorealism,” 
Harvard International Review 26 (2004): 27.  
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1. Primary Sources 
Primary sources generally include official documents from applicable 
international organizations (i.e., United Nations and ASEAN), discussed nation-states 
(i.e., Cambodia and Indonesia), and sundry non-governmental and inter-governmental 
organizations. Additional primary sources may include the media, and to a very limited 
extent social networking Internet sites (i.e., public blogs); social networking sites have 
provided valuable insight into the both international and national criticism of the 
Kingdom of Cambodia’s participation in UN-PKO. Finally, the author’s personal 
observations, gathered over the course of several deployments to both Cambodia and 
Indonesia in support of the United States Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative 
(GPOI), will be provided when appropriated.     
2. Secondary Sources  
Many of the secondary sources used in writing this thesis deal with Cambodia 
either during or after the reign of Pol Pot. In this area, Ben Kiernan’s The Pol Pot 
Regime, Elizabeth Becker’s When the War Was Over, and Evan Gottesman’s Cambodia 
After the Khmer Rouge proved extremely valuable.  Additionally, the United States 
Government’s 1990 study of Cambodia, edited by Russell R. Ross, also proved highly 
beneficial.  
In dealing with the comparative chapter on Indonesia, Adrian Vickers A History 
of Modern Indonesia, and Jacques Bertrand’s Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in 
Indonesia, were indispensible. Additionally, Indonesia–Cambodia: Forging Ties 
Through Thick and Thin, edited by Nazaruddin Nasution, provided some intriguing 
insight on the bonds shared by formerly “non-aligned” nations.  
3. In-Case and Comparative Case Studies  
This thesis will examine Cambodia’s participation in UN-PKO using both in-case 
and comparative case studies. The dynamics of Cambodia’s participation in UN-PKO 
allow for an in-case comparison to be conducted across a broad spectrum of time. 
Specifically, this thesis will examine the role of the armed forces during the immediate 
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post-colonial Sihanouk era, as well as under the political stewardship of heads-of-state 
Lon Nol, Pol Pot, Hun Sen.  
Additionally, Cambodia’s participation in UN-PKO will be examined in a 
comparative context with the participation of other Southeast Asian nations; specifically, 
this thesis will examine the Kingdom of Cambodia’s current level of participation in UN-
PKO with that of the Republic of Indonesia.  
F. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis will consist of five chapters. This chapter provides a very brief 
introduction to the topic, as well as a short literature review regarding potential nation–
state motivations for participation in United Nations led peacekeeping operations.  
Chapter II deals with the evolution of Cambodian politics from independence to 
the modern era. Each of the key personalities in Cambodia’s political past will be 
examined, beginning with Norodom Sihanouk and concluding with Hun Sen. 
Furthermore, this chapter will briefly examine how growing regional interdependence in 
an unsteady security environment have influenced Cambodian decision makers.   
Chapter III traces the evolution and employment of Cambodia’s armed forces. 
The most conspicuous arm of the political regime, Cambodia’s military has been utilized 
by the previous regimes to consolidate domestic political power, and prop-up a 
burdensome patronage system. However, the contemporary Royal Cambodian Armed 
Forces is in the process of transformation, gradually embarking on nobler efforts.       
Chapter IV provides a comparative case study on Indonesia’s participation in 
United Nations-led peacekeeping operations. Once used for the suppression of internal 
unrest, the TNI now plays a significant role in peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
in the Middle East.  
Chapter V briefly offers a prognosis for Cambodia and its role in peacekeeping, as 
well as presents some personal observations from the author.  
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II. THE POLITICS OF CAMBODIA 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Donald E. Weatherbee writes: 
From independence, the states of Southeast Asia, individually and 
collectively, have struggled in their international environments for policy 
autonomy. By autonomy is meant the ability to pursue self-defined 
national interests with-in the limits of national capabilities, free from 
externally imposed political, economic, or military constraints.33 
Since independence, Cambodian elites have persistently espoused the principles of non-
intervention and neutrality; however, a combination of internal and external security 
threats has prohibited successive regimes from pursuing unilateral approaches to political 
stability, economic development, or security.  
For a nation largely dependent on financial aid, the principles of neutrality and 
non-intervention are, essentially, no longer pertinent. Weatherbee continues, “The irony 
in the struggle for autonomy is that while Southeast Asian states enhance their 
capabilities through globalization, they meet new categories of nontraditional policy-
limiting demands aggressively promoted not only by states, but by international 
nongovernmental organizations that, unlike states, can penetrate sovereignty with direct 
links to domestic NGO counterparts.”34 Since independence, Cambodian heads-of-state 
have been required to balance national interests with international expectations.  
Increasingly, Cambodia has had to turn to regional and international organizations 
for support. Cambodia’s admittance into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) in early 1999 allowed the nation to pursue regional economic integration 
                                                 
33 Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 
(2009), 22–23.  
34 Ibid.  
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initiatives, and re-evaluate existing security concerns, all while continuing to promote 
non-intervention.  Kai He writes,  
The increasing economic interdependence in the region along with 
international trade and foreign investment rendered traditional military 
balancing inadequate in dealing with ASEAN’s security concerns. 
ASEAN states [such as Cambodia], therefore, chose institutional 
balancing to pursue security, i.e. relying on multilateral institutions to bind 
and constrain targeted challengers or using institutions to countervail the 
pressures from potential threats.35  
Unlike previous regimes, the current government under Prime Minister Hun Sen actively 
pursues an “institutional balancing” approach to mitigating regional security concerns 
and international criticism of domestic socio–political conditions.   
B.  “THE WEATHERVANE PRINCE”: HEAD-OF-STATE NORODOM 
SIHANOUK36 
Cambodia achieved independence from France on November 9, 1953.37 Almost 
immediately, the nation’s elites were faced with a conundrum: retain the monarchy, 
which maintained popular support in the rural areas but was viewed by some urbanites as 
tainted by French influence, or make a bold move towards a more western form of 
democracy.38 Ultimately, the decision would rest with King Norodom Sihanouk. 
Sihanouk chose to cobble together various aspects of western democracy and 
predominately-eastern authoritarian politics. Serge Thion writes, “Although formally 
relinquishing the regalia to his father Suramarit, [Sihanouk] nevertheless retained as 
many royal trappings as possible, and there was no question for the population as to who 
the real king was.”39 Sihanouk made certain political concessions in order to hide the 
                                                 
35 He, “Institutional Balancing,” 511.  
36 Norodom Sihanouk, War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 
xxxi. 
37 Marie Alexandrine Martin, Cambodia: A Shattered Society (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1994), 62 
38 Serge Thion, “The Pattern of Cambodian Politics,” in The Cambodian Agony, eds. David A Abling 
and Marlowe Hood (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1987), 153.   
39  Ibid., 154.  
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reality of life in post-colonial Cambodia from the international community. Thion 
continues, “[Sihanouk] was the perfect ‘Oriental’ ruler, with harem politics, secret police, 
widespread corruption, costly festivals, and even a touch of buffoonery in the shape of his 
absurd dabbling in singing and movie making.”40 Film-making aside, Sihanouk’s efforts 
to shield the regime from the scrutiny of an international community increasingly 
growing concerned with domestic strife would ultimately shape Cambodia’s 
contemporary foreign policy.  
Regarding Sihanouk’s foreign policy, Russell H. Fifield writes, “Sovereignty, 
independence, and neutrality are closely linked in the Cambodian outlook.”41  Faced with 
a growing insurgency, Sihanouk promoted a foreign policy of neutrality in order to stay 
out of the growing Cold War conflict in neighboring Vietnam. Sihanouk states,  
my country has adopted these principles [sovereignty, independence, and 
neutrality] and wishes to apply them to the fullest extent. In doing so, she 
only requests an absolute reciprocity. She requests that her independence, 
her integrity, her security, her traditions and political ideology be not 
threatened.42 
Fifield surmises, “Strict neutrality in the national interest was essential for a small state 
like Cambodia whose role must be moral based on psychological and political rather than 
military or economic strength.”43 Cambodia simply could not afford to actively engage 
its fledgling military in both the domestic and international arenas.  
Choosing to exploit personal diplomacy to the greatest extent possible, Sihanouk 
sought to maintain strained ties with Washington through-out the late 1950s and 1960s; 
concurrently, he endeavored to establish secret relations with Cambodia’s historic rival in 
the region—the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Sihanouk believed that Cambodia’s 
                                                 
40 Thion, “The Pattern of Cambodian Politics,” 154. 
41 Russell H. Fifield, The Dipomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945–1958 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1958), 392. 
41 Sihanouk felt so strongly about such ideals, he resigned from political office when he perceived 
aggressive U.S. policies were attempting to subvert Cambodian sovereignty. However, with-in a few 
weeks, U.S. Secretary of State John F. Dulles was able to calm Cambodian fears, and Sihanouk resumed 
his official duties. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945–1958, 393.  
43 Ibid., 395.  
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national sovereignty, as well as his hold on the nation, could be maintained by deftly 
balancing the warring powers.44 However, Sihanouk’s inability to effectively balance 
domestic grievances in concert with international politics would prove to be his downfall.  
Sihanouk succumbed to the mounting pressures of internal social and political 
unrest, coupled with transnational regional conflict. Regarding domestic turmoil, 
Elizabeth Becker writes, “In the end, Sihanouk created his own personal hell, in part 
because of his ‘rampage’ against the communists, which killed far more innocent 
villagers than true communists, who were still few in number.”45 Furthermore, by the late 
1960s, most of Cambodia’s rice (the staple of the country and the cornerstone of the 
economy) was being illicitly sold to North Vietnamese troops transiting along 
Cambodia’s eastern border. In order to keep men under arms, Sihanouk authorized the 
army to harvest and store whatever rice could be found in private fields, bringing troops 
and farmers in many provinces to blows.46 A failing economy, together with growing 
social and political unrest, created a permissive environment for a North Vietnamese-
backed insurgency to fully emerge in southeastern Cambodia. Conversely, as the 
communist insurgency gained strength in the east, anti-Vietnamese sentiment simmered 
to the boiling point in Phnom Penh. Many politicians felt that neutrality had simply been 
the wrong path for Cambodia to follow in such a complex security environment.  
C. “THE BLACK PAPA”: PRESIDENT LON NOL47 
Cambodia’s policy of strict neutrality would be replaced by one which favored 
renewed ties with the west–particularly with the United States. Becker writes, “From the 
[post-Sihanouk] start, the republic staked its legitimacy on a vow to rid the country of the 
threat from the Vietnamese communists. As head of the armed forces, Lon Nol 
                                                 
44 David Chandler, A History of Cambodia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 195.  
45 Elizabeth Becker, When the War Was Over (New York: Public Affairs, 1986), 110.  
46 Ibid., 104: Chandler,  A History of Cambodia, 201. 
47 Becker, When the War Was Over, 127.  
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automatically became the figure charged with fulfilling that promise.”48 Lon Nol did not 
have to look far for potential allies.  
Cambodia’s middle class abhorred Sihanouk’s management of the national 
economy, as well as his attempts to establish ties with North Vietnam. David Chandler 
writes,  
These men [primarily from the Sino-Cambodian Middle Class] thought 
Sihanouk’s style embarrassing and his economic policies disastrous. Many 
of them, like most of the army officer corps, regretted Cambodia’s rupture 
with the United States and objected to the fact that the nationalization of 
imports and exports had moved this profitable sector of the economy into 
the hands of government officials.49  
Non-Khmer businessmen found themselves on the periphery during Sihanouk’s reign; by 
mid-March 1970, these men were able to collectively pressure the National Assembly 
into deposing Sihanouk, and installing a triumvirate composed of Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, 
and Cheng Heng.50   
Under the control of the decidedly pro-Western triumvirate, the Khmer Republic 
quickly severed diplomatic ties with Hanoi, and re-established relations with 
Washington.51 Obviously, this was dramatic departure from the neutrality espoused by 
Sihanouk. Becker writes, “The North Vietnamese now asserted that Cambodia was no 
longer neutral, pointing to Lon Nol’s entente with South Vietnam as proof. [Therefore,] 
Cambodia was an active participant in the war.”52 North Vietnamese forces increased the 
scale of military operations along Cambodia’s border, and U.S. forces responded in kind. 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 117.  
49 Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 195.  
50  United States Department of the Army, Cambodia: A Country Study, ed. Russell A. Ross 
(Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990), 43. Becker, When the War Was Over, 117.  
51 Becker claims that North Vietnamese diplomats were expelled from the country with-in nine days 
of the coup. Ibid.  
52 Ibid., 118.  
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Such operations ultimately drove North Vietnamese forces deep inside the newly 
established republic.53  
 Conflict between soldiers and farmers over the recent rice harvest reignited as 
battle-worn, starving Cambodian and North Vietnamese units sought refuge from an 
unrelenting American air campaign. As many as 40,000 rural Cambodians descended on 
the capitol in order to demand the reinstatement of Sihanouk, and ostensibly the 
reassertion of Cambodia’s neutrality.54 However, their cries would fall on deaf ears. 
Between 1970 and 1975, Khmer Republic forces would impotently attempt to consolidate 
power through-out the rural provinces, most of which were already under the tight control 
of Khmer Rouges cadres.55  
Ultimately, Lon Nol’s belief in the occult would prove to be the army’s undoing. 
Baker writes, “[Lon Nol] intervened with orders to wage a holy war, reordered battle 
plans according to predictions of his personal astrologer, restructured military campaigns 
in order to capture holy monuments rather than enemy positions.”56 Depleted after two 
unsuccessful operations against communist forces operating well with-in Cambodia’s 
territorial boundaries (i.e., Operations Chenla I and Chenla II), the Cambodian military 
was forced to give up Lon Nol’s “holy war.”57 The republic’s capital, Phnom Penh, fell 
to communist Cambodian insurgent forces on the morning of April 17, 1975.  
                                                 
53 The North Vietnamese even shifted their headquarters from the border to areas further inside 
Cambodian territorial boundaries in order to counter pro-western influences. United States Army, 
Cambodia, xxx, 44–45.  
54 United States Army, Cambodia, 43.  
55 Ibid., 44.  
56 Becker, When the War Was Over, 124.  
57 Chenla I was conducted in August 1970 against North Vietnamese forces operating along the 
Phnom Penh–Skuon highway. Chenla II was conducted almost exactly one year later, along Highway Six, 
running between Phnom Penh and Kompong Thom. Ibid., 130–132. 
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D. “THE ORIGINAL CAMBODIAN”: SOLATH SAR (POL POT)58 
Ben Kiernan writes, “From the ashes of rural Cambodia arose Pol Pot’s 
Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK).”59 After almost a decade of armed conflict, and 
spurred by the promise of a return to an idealized Khmer empire, rural Cambodian youth 
from the eastern provinces flocked to arms in defense of the CPK, a phenomenon 
evidence by the dramatic growth of the Khmer Rouge through-out the early to mid-
1970s. Becker writes,  
The Khmer Rouge combined appeals to the Khmer national pride with 
communist prescriptions for greater economic and political justice. It was 
the first time in Cambodia’s history that the rural people were being asked 
to play a significant role in a social movement, and the effect was 
profound.60  
Once again, Cambodia’s politicians would gamble the state’s resources on regime 
survival; this time, it would come at the wholly unnecessary expense of up to 3 million 
men, women, and children.  
Born in 1928, Solath Sar spent much of his adolescence in Phnom Penh’s royal 
compound.61 Kiernan writes, “Few Cambodian childhoods were so removed from their 
vernacular culture.”62 The author explains, “The palace compound was closeted and 
conservative, the old King a French puppet.”63Spending much of his time among French 
colonial administrators, young Solath Sar was not only exposed to colonial government 
procedures but also to persistent colonial bigotry, neither of which would positively 
shape his personal / political point-of-view.  
                                                 
58 “The Original Cambodian” was Solath Sar’s nom de plume during the 1950s. Ben Kiernan, The Pol 
Pot Regime (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 11.  
59 Ibid., 19.  
60 Becker, When the War Was Over, 137.  
61 Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, 19.  
62 Ibid., 10.  
63 Ibid.  
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As an adult, Solath Sar was exposed to French, and later North Vietnamese 
communist rhetoric. He was an active member of the French Communist Party during his 
failed academic stint at a Parisian university.64 Upon his return to Cambodia in 1953, he 
accompanied his brother, Saloth Chhay, to multiple meetings between Cambodian and 
North Vietnamese communists anxious to spread the ideology through-out fragmented 
Indochina.65 Eventually, Cambodia’s communist element would splinter from the rest of 
Indochinese communist movement, taking Solath Sar with them.   
By the early 1970s, Solath Sar found himself as the Khmer Rouge’s “first vice 
president and chief of the military conduct of the war” against the North Vietnamese 
forces then-present in the eastern provinces.66 Following cessation of U.S.–Vietnamese 
hostilities in 1973, Solath Sar shifted his orientation from one primarily anti-Vietnamese 
to one generally anti-Non-Khmer Rouge. Despite extensive U.S. aircraft interdiction, the 
Khmer Rouge was able to exercise almost near complete control of the agricultural 
production of several rural provinces, and blunt not one but several Khmer Republic 
ground campaigns. Even before the fall of Phnom Pen, “the Khmer Rouge [had] ordered 
everyone into their zones grouped into strict cooperatives, fortresses that locked up the 
people, the harvest, and all material possessions for the exclusive use of the party and the 
revolution.”67  
Kiernan writes, “[Democratic Kampuchean] policies deprived peasants of three of 
the most cherished features of their lifestyle: land, family, and religion.”68 The author 
clarifies,  
Religion was suppressed in the name of conservation. All religious and 
social celebrations were prohibited, and Buddhism was derided as 
backward and feudal. Marriage was more or less outlawed, so the party 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 11.  
65 Ibid.  
66 Becker, When the War Was Over, 139.  
67 Becker, When the War Was Over, 148.  
68 Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, 167.  
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could induct young men and women into the army more easily. Gaiety 
was suspect.69  
Cambodians were left with few options: plant rice…or plant land mines.     
As early as April 1975, Cambodians of all ethnic groups and social classes were 
forcibly moved from the cities to the countryside in order to supplement the rural 
workforce. According to many CPK officials, as well as some foreign observers, the de-
urbanization of Cambodia was necessary to re-establish rice production to pre-Cold War 
levels; however, the de-urbanization of Cambodia also allowed the CPK to conduct 
business without the fetters of a domestic body-politic.70  
Focused almost solely on the survival of the regime, the CPK failed to provide 
even the most basic of human needs. Kiernan writes,  
The Center’s quest for total domestic and substantial regional power by 
massive military build-up had indentured Cambodia’s economy to China’s 
indefinitely. Domestically, Democratic Kampuchea’s population was also 
a bonded workforce, unpaid and lacking even a guarantee of subsistence 
rations.71  
The movement of over two million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) exasperated 
conditions in the countryside. Having initially forfeited the majority of their food stores 
to North Vietnamese forces, the farmers of the outlaying provinces were now required to 
not only feed themselves but an additional two million others. Furthermore, they were 
also ordered to contribute the majority of their harvest to CPK monitored aggregation 
centers in order to fuel the one-sided arms race between Cambodia and the rest of the 
region. The social and economic burden simply proved to be too much for the 
Cambodian people. Ultimately, “between 1 million and 3 million persons died because of 
purges, beatings, malnourishment, and overwork.”72  
                                                 
69 Ibid., 153.  
70 Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 210-211.  
71 Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 163.  
72 United States Department of the Army, Cambodia: A Country Study,  pg. xxxii. David Chandler, et. 
al., “Cambodia since 1975,” in The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia, ed. Norman G. Owen (Honolulu: 
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Following numerous skirmishes in the waning months of 1978, 120,000 battle-
hardened Vietnamese troops streamed across the Cambodian–Vietnamese border and 
brought the reign of the Khmer Rouge to a quick and violent end.73 Pol Pot, along with 
thousands of other Khmer Rouge cadre, retreated into the hinterlands. Peace would 
remain elusive for Cambodia; Vietnam would maintain a presence in the country until 
1991.  
E. “THE JUNGLE FIGHTER”: PRIME MINISTER HUN SEN  
1.  A Jungle Fighter’s Rise to Power 
One man would emerge from the turmoil of the 1970s to rule modern Cambodia–
Hun Sen. Becker writes,  
His short adult life had been spent entirely in a military uniform. Since the age of 
sixteen, when he dropped out of a Phnom Penh high school and joined the Khmer Rouge 
movement, Hun Sen had gone from one battle to another, suffering five serious injuries in 
the murderous, chaotic revolution.74  
Despite the loss of one eye while taking Phnom Penh in the name of the 
regime, he was forced to escape to neighboring Vietnam in 1977 in order 
to avoid execution at the hands of Khmer Rouge enforcers. 
Unarguably charismatic, the former Khmer Rouge soldier was able to quickly 
earn the favor of the Vietnamese leadership.75 In fact, Hun Sen was not only able to win-
over the Vietnamese but also Soviet diplomat Igor Rogachev, who would adopt him as a 
sort of protégé.76 The well-tutored former guerrilla would initially be posted as the head 
of the diplomatic branch of the newly installed Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).  
                                                 
73 Sihanouk, War and Hope, xxvii.  
74 Becker, When the War Was Over, 441.  
75 Evan Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 47.  
76 Becker, When the War Was Over, 441–442.  
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Hun Sen assumed a political office with no historic precedent to dictate the roles 
and responsibilities of the position. Gottesman writes,  
The Khmer Rouge’s extermination of civil servants had nearly erased a 
national memory of how government worked. With few experienced 
bureaucrats and with ministers who themselves had no administrative 
background, the civil service succumbed to the natural bureaucratic 
tendency to appropriate power and assume overlapping responsibilities.77  
This simple fact accounts for much of the political control witnessed today; Hun Sen was 
able to shape the Cambodian political landscape accordingly, and at leisure.   
Hun Sen proved adept at “taking charge of a country that the rest of the world 
thought of only in terms of violence and open conflict.”78 Standing largely on the 
shoulders of a well-educated Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) staff, and closely 
tutored by Vietnamese and Russian diplomats, he was promoted from Deputy Prime 
Minister to Prime Minister (PM) in January 1985.79 Almost immediately, the PM shifted 
the focus of the state towards economic stability, creating a number of ministries whose 
purpose was to repair the damage of the unsound economic policies of the previous 
administrations.80  
However, Hun Sen’s good intentions would ultimately prove to hinder socio-
political progress. Gottesman writes, “Although the new civil servants were generally 
inept at regulating the country’s increasingly private economy, they were able to 
intervene in day-to-day matters, collecting taxes and bribes and passing the revenues on 
to their superiors. The state thus turned into a sprawling and heterogeneous network of 
ministries, agencies, and provincial and local administrations whose members adhered to 
the rules of patronage.”81  
                                                 
77 Ibid., 50.  
78 Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 205. 
79 Ibid., 208–209.  
80Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 215.  
81 Ibid., 211.  
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Faced with the need for economic self-sufficiency in the post-Cold War world, 
Hun Sen and the PRK looked to re-establish ties with the region, and the world. Even 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Hun Sen attempted to preemptively co-opt 
Sihanouk prior to his return to Cambodia. Gottesman writes, “[Hun Sen] wanted to drive 
a wedge between the supposedly adaptable prince and his seemingly intractable 
Cambodian and foreign allies.”82 Moreover, Hun Sen took significant steps at moving 
Cambodia’s economic outlook from “‘the left to the right.’”83 This was in direct 
opposition to communist ideology; however, as Gottesman points out, “By encouraging 
competition within the state sector, Hun Sen and the like-minded leaders were apt to 
consider the resources at their disposal as assets to be exploited for profit. For Hun Sen 
and much of the rest of the leadership, a permissive system of this sort was the key to 
consolidating power. It created networks of happy officials whose loyalty the regime 
could count on, even after the Vietnamese withdrew and Sihanouk returned.”84   
Hun Sen’s patronage network would ultimately cement his position in 
government. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) made 
significant strides in mentoring Cambodia’s disenfranchised, as well as monitoring a 
democratic election in which almost over 4 million Cambodians participated.85 However, 
Cambodia’s initial foray into democracy was not very promising for the Cambodian 
People’s Party (CPP); the party did not gain a majority of the seats in the 1993 elections. 
Frieson writes, “Hun Sen’s campaign was focused more on what the party had 
accomplished in the past than on what it would do in the future, which was not reassuring 
to many Cambodians, who were sickened by official corruption, grinding poverty, and 
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the lack of an open political environment.”86 Hun Sen failed to comprehend the over-
arching lessons of the Sihanouk, Lon Nol, and Pol Pot regimes. 
Ultimately, the CPP was required to strong-arm the urban political base in order 
to achieve political consolidation. Hun Sen was able to convince fellow CPP members by 
mid-1997 that opposition party members had been “colluding with the Khmer Rouge.”87  
Kate Frieson argues that any opposition to the CPP was portrayed as detrimental to the 
nation-state; she writes,  
[the CPP] was incapable of regarding opposition political parties as 
legitimate rivals because it meticulously constructed a view of the 
opposition as the ‘enemy’ (khmang) and reproduced this view so 
thoroughly in its propaganda and its political chain of command that 
actions taken against political parties were considered equivalent to 
patriotic duty.88  
In the military, one’s patriot duty was often confused with one’s political 
affiliation. Lewis M. Stern writes, “Between 1995 and 1997, none of the elements that 
were allowed to remain armed and to enter into the formation of a national army adopted 
a form of thinking that would have enabled the creation of a single, coherent national 
military.”89 According to Stern, “The KPNLF and ANS, and Hun Sen, continued to speak 
in terms of their own interests and organizations, making claims for a fair and balanced 
equation for selecting senior generals, promoting general officers, and making defense 
policy and military strategy that served narrow organizational (not national) interests.”90 
In contrast, under the prying eyes of the United Nations, the existing cadres of PRK 
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officials were able to refine their bureaucratic processes; KPRA officers were often 
selected over their KPNLAF and ANS counterparts.91 
By the first months of new millennium, patriotism and political affiliation had 
finally aligned under the CPP banner. Sorpong Peou writes, “Hun Sen got what he always 
wanted—a monopoly of power (his politico-military victory over Ranariddh and the 
Khmer Rouge rebels), the UN seat for his government, and Cambodian membership in 
ASEAN.”92 Prime Minister Hun Sen viewed the succession of victories as proof of the 
CPP’s strength in the domestic arena.93  
2.  Giving Cambodia a Voice in International Affairs 
Having consolidated power, Hun Sen began to give Cambodia a voice in the 
global commons. Rising above the cacophony of other developing nations, he initially 
called for the reform of international and region political and economic organizations. In 
early 2000, at the first G77 South Summit held in Havana, Cuba, he gave the following 
address: 
[W]e should pay much attention to strengthening cooperation among 
countries in the South. G 77 countries should join forces into one block to 
protect the interests of developing countries on the international arena, 
especially in the United Nations and at other international negotiations, 
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). To this end, we have to 
consider measures to promote and improve our world body. Cambodia 
voices support for the reform of the United Nations. We understand that it 
is necessary for all of us to strictly uphold the Charter of the United 
Nations and strengthen the role of the Security Council in the peace-
keeping process in the world. At the same time, we believe that 
developing countries should enhance their role in charting the future of the 
world within the framework of the UN Security Council.94  
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Hun Sen’s call for Security Council reform would be echoed by all of the G77 nations 
during the 2005 Doha, Qatar conference; Section 22 of the Doha Charter states,  
We attach high priority to the reform of the United Nations with the 
objective to strengthen the Organization, so that it can efficiently respond 
to the current and future challenges affecting the international community, 
in particular those concerns and interests of developing countries which 
constitute the vast majority of its membership.95  
PM Hun Sen’s desire to reform international and regional organizations, primarily 
from with-in, also reflects his desire to influence domestic politics. Speaking at the 7th 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, held in Siem Reap in late 2009, the PM stated, “The 
Kingdom of Cambodia, as a member of ASEAN, has been integrating itself in all sectors 
according to the concept of globalization in order to strengthen good governance, ensure 
social stability and the development of national economy, aiming to fully participate in 
the process of nation building.”96 However, all that glitters is not gold. Andrew Cock 
writes, 
A formal willingness of the ruling elite to implement effective measures 
for reform comes and goes. Substantial, coordinated pressure from 
external actors, and the perception by the ruling elite that they have no 
other alternative may elicit commitments and acts that can be construed as 
signs of reform. However, when external pressures ease, when the 
initiatives of pro-active external actors are worn down, or disputes 
between external actors can be manipulated, the willingness of the ruling 
elite to move forward with these reform measures quickly declines.97 
Reminiscent of criticisms hurled at head-of-state Sihanouk, Steve Heder writes,  
Building on his long-held, princely sounding title Samdech, Hun Sen also 
continued [in 2010] to appropriate the trappings of royalty and 
increasingly of sacral and supernatural might, such that he was widely 
seen as the real monarch of the Kingdom of Cambodia, not the secluded 
                                                 
95 Second South Summit, “Doha Charter,” Second South Summitt of the Group of 77 (June 12, 2005). 
Available online at: http://www.g77.org/southsummit2/en/intro.html, accessed September 17, 2010. 
96 Prime Minister Samdech Techo Hun Sen. “Prime Minister (PM) Hun Sen Speech.” Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (November 17, 2009). Available online at: 
http://www.aseansec.org/documents/PM-Hun-Sen-Speech.pdf, accessed September 16, 2010.  
97 Andrew Robert Cock, “External Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Elite in post-
UNTAC Cambodia,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 41 (2010): 262.  
 28 
King Norodom Sihamoni, son of the retired King Norodom Sihanouk. 
Hun Sen was portrayed as a military and economic genius; as the 
reincarnation of the sixteenth-century commoner, Khmer-turned hero-king 
Sdech Kan; and as a nine-headed naga (serpent) with magical powers.”98  
The current regime’s reversion to more authoritarian measures is due in some 
measure to the existing patronage system. Ear writes,  
Large and generous infusions of aid have enabled the authorities to not 
improve domestic revenue collection, particularly an effective tax 
collection system (since aid is fungible), which in turn has led to weak 
state capacity in the post-conflict period, and instead allowed a patronage 
system of informal revenue collection to blossom in which authorities do 
not need ‘people,’ just loyalty in the chain of hierarchy.99  
David Chandler writes,  
For most Cambodians, these shifting networks of subordination and 
control, chosen or imposed, benevolent or otherwise, [mark] the limits of 
their experience and of the social expectations.”100 As Ear warns, “Short 
of a fundamental change in the political system such as regime change, 
unchecked social instability, or ill health, there is little doubt as to who 
will run Cambodia through 2010 and far beyond.”101 
F.  CONCLUSION 
Describing the succession of political regimes in Cambodia, Sorpong Peou writes:  
Between 1954 and 1991, the country adopted different anti-democratic 
political systems: paternalistic under Prince Sihanouk, republican under 
Lon Nol, revolutionary totalitarianism under Pol Pot, and socialist 
dictatorship under Hun Sen. No one could give the country what it needed 
most, namely peace, stability and security.102 
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Stability, particularly in and around Phnom Penh, proved elusive until the late 1990s; by 
the early 2000s, a modicum of political and social stability allowed for the gradual 
emergence of notable economic growth.  
Cambodia’s ruling elite have taken advantage of the prevailing peace to pursue 
limited regional objectives, and mitigate international criticism, primarily through the use 
of “institutional balancing” methods. Less than thirty-six months after being admitted 
into the organization, Cambodia was the host of “the 8th ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN 
Plus Three Summit, [and] ASEAN Plus One Summits with China, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, and with India.”103 Moreover, Cambodia’s willing to host an ASEAN–EU 
Security Summit in 2009 demonstrates the current government’s willingness to look 
outside of regional arrangements for economic sustainment, and possibly security. 
However, the utility of regional and international organizations is dependent upon the 
commitment of the individual member-states. To achieve tangible benefits, a member-
state must be more than a gracious host. The next chapter will examine one of 
Cambodia’s more prominent physical contributions to an international organization—
peacekeepers. 
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III.  THE ROLE OF THE ROYAL CAMBODIAN ARMED FORCES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The armed forces of Cambodia have always served as “the political leaders’ best 
instrument in advancing their political interests.”104 Primarily, such interests have been 
“…national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.”105 Additionally, 
beginning in the early 1950s, the armed forces of Cambodia have been asked to fulfill a 
laundry list of extraneous tasks, to include the suppression of social unrest, the repression 
of political parties deemed to promote values counter to the progress of the state, and the 
construction of vast public works projects.   
By the early 2000s, Cambodian troops were given a new role–peacekeeping. A 
dramatic departure from previous roles, peacekeeping asked for an almost exclusively 
internal security orientated force to perform international peace operations. Therefore, 
peacekeeping also required widespread military reform, and a re-orientation of 
Cambodia’s military doctrine. Cambodia pursues peacekeeping as a means of accruing 
the international prestige points necessary for the effective pursuit of “institutional 
balancing” policies. Moreover, Cambodia seeks to increase its participation in 
peacekeeping as a means to efficiently affect military reform across a broader section of 
the military, improve force capacity in multilateral operations, and ultimately gain 
additional leverage in regional and international organizations. 
B.  HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE RCAF 
The armed forces of Cambodia were initially formed in the tumultuous months of 
late-Summer 1945, immediately following the withdrawal of Japanese troops. With the 
demobilization of occupational Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), the French colony found 
itself under assault from two insurgencies: the Khmer Issarak in the West, and the Khmer 
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People’s Liberation Army (KPLA) in the East.106 In response, Prince Monireth quickly 
mustered the first battalion of the armed forces of Cambodia from recently demobilized 
French colonial light infantry non-commissioned officers. Additionally, he established a 
non-commissioned officer’s school in order to train replacements for those recently put 
under arms, and expected to conduct counter-insurgency operations.107 By 1947, over 
6,000 Cambodians were serving in either the Garde Nationale (GN) or the two Bataillon 
de Chasseurs Cambodgiens (BdCC).108    
Between the late 1940s and 1952, the GN and BdCC would grow in both size and 
scope. Initially, GN personnel were under joint French–Cambodian operational control; 
however, through various formal and informal arrangements, Cambodian battalion 
commanders and provincial leaders were granted operational autonomy.109 By the fall of 
Diem Bien Phu, French colonial military cadre officers could see the writing on the wall–
their authority over a force already starting to exhibit autonomous tendencies was, at best, 
tenuous.  Besides, wholly French forces were already stretched far too thin to deal 
effectively with either the Thai-backed Khmer Issarak insurgency, or the communist 
Vietnamese-backed KPLA. By delegating operational control of the Cambodian 
battalions to Cambodian leaders, French military officers could begin to quickly 
formulate an exit strategy.  
The Forces Armeés Royales Khmères (FARK) emerged almost immediately 
following Cambodia’s independence from France. Despite a significant internal threat, 
Cambodia’s political elite quickly re-oriented the force from counter-insurgency to 
border defense in order to ensure post-independence sovereignty. Ross writes, “FARK’s 
mission thus became a defensive one, that is, to insure Cambodia’s territorial integrity 
within the framework of neutrality.”110 FARK forces were deployed in large numbers to 
the hinterlands, particularly along the nation’s border with then-partitioned Vietnam.  
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By early 1955, the FARK began to receive promises of military assistance from 
the United States. The U.S. recognized the potential for the FARK to fulfill security 
requirements along the Mekong River and its many tributaries. Almost a decade before 
the Vietnam War, Washington authorized the deployment of a Military Assistance 
Advisory Group to the Kingdom of Cambodia (MAAG-KC) in order to assess the 
possibility for the establishment of U.S. bases, and the provision of additional aide and 
assistance to the FARK.111 However, despite close military-to-military relations, 
diplomatic tensions would ultimately choke off western materiel and financial support.   
By 1965, following repeated cross-border incursions by South Vietnamese forces, 
diplomatic ties between the U.S. and Cambodia were severed, and the FARK were forced 
to look elsewhere for training and logistics. An omen of things to come, FARK soldiers 
were presented with a logistics nightmare; Ross writes, “The inevitable results of a 
variety of [often private] suppliers were mixed equipment inventories.”112 It was with 
this grab-bag of military equipment, and limited professional training, that the FARK 
would attempt to repress the emerging Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK).  
In the opening stages of the Cold War era, the force was significantly transformed 
from a guerrilla force fighting against the Japanese, to a version of gendarme conducting 
counter-insurgency operations, to a standing army tasked with maintaining territorial 
integrity. Over the next twenty years, the force would be torn asunder by a multitude of 
international, regional, and domestic factors.  
It would be a former FARK officer, Lon Nol, who would ineffectively attempt to 
re-orientate the force once again. The re-branded Forces Armées Nationales Khmères 
(FANK) was tasked with not only maintaining the nation’s already encroached borders 
but also countering yet another insurgent force rapidly gaining strength in the rural 
provinces.  Realizing a well trained and equipped force was required to positively affect 
the domestic security environment, Lon Nol was able to rebuild many of the diplomatic 
bridges burnt by Sihanouk; however, despite renewed assistance, the FANK continued to 
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be hampered by severe logistical shortfalls and incompetent operational leadership.113 
Moreover, by 1971, the FANK was facing not one but three separate hostile elements 
operating with-in the country: the North Vietnamese Army (NVA); the RAK; and an 
insurgent group backed by the recently deposed Sihanouk, the Gouvernement Royal 
d’Union Nationale du Kampuchéa (GRUNK).  
By late 1972, RAK and GRUNK units combined to form the Cambodian People’s 
National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF). Intense, prolonged U.S. bombing attacks 
against CPNLAF targets in eastern Cambodia only strengthened the group’s resolve, and 
swelled its ranks with disgruntled farmers and displaced urbanites. Becker writes, “The 
Army had become the fraternity that bound together the uprooted peasants and 
intellectuals who had abandoned their farms or their city careers. Proving oneself in battle 
was as great as any for a revolution.”114 This armed mob of peasants and scholars rapidly 
dismantled the country in the name of revolution.  
During the reign of the Khmer Rouge, RAK battalions (the label a nostalgic nod 
to its Khmer Rouge roots) were assigned to various administrative sectors throughout the 
country.115 However, such fragmentation would also prove to be the RAK’s downfall. 
Ross writes,  
Troops from one zone frequently were sent to another zone to enforce 
discipline. It was such efforts to discipline zonal secretaries and their 
dissident or ideologically impure cadres that gave rise to the purges that 
were to decimate the RAK ranks, to undermine the moral of the victorious 
army, and to generate the seeds of rebellion [against the Khmer Rouge].116  
Valor in battle gave way to unprecedented corruption in peace. Petty infighting between 
RAK commanders and Khmer Rouge leaders undermined cohesion, and paved the way 
for yet another armed group to assume control of the country; this time, the conquering 
force would come from outside the country.  
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Following the Vietnamese invasion of December 1978, the Vietnamese Army 
assumed command of any remaining vestiges of the state’s armed forces, which was 
subsequently labeled by the Vietnamese as the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary 
Army (KPRA), and finally by Cambodians themselves as the Cambodian People’s 
Armed Forces (CPAF). With the Vietnamese Army shouldering much of the security 
burden, the CPAF was allowed to revert back to a system of economic predation 
prevalent during the Sihanouk, Lon Nol, and even Pol Pot regimes. Gottesman writes, “In 
the field Cambodian military units operated under the direct control of the Vietnamese 
command.”117 However, not all aspects of a CPAF soldier’s life could be regulated by a 
foreign command and control structure. The author continues, “Where Cambodian units 
operated independently, they [exclusively] guarded roads and bridges–in effect, acting as 
tax collectors for their commanding officers or local authorities.”118 Moreover, various 
CPAF units in the hinterlands took advantage of their relative autonomy by quickly 
setting up large (and illicit) fishing, timber, and even transportation operations.119 In turn, 
CPAF officers were able to take the profits from such enterprises and make significant 
contributions to the local patronage structure. Gottesman writes, “In strategically 
important provinces like Battambang, military chiefs were appointed as [Communist] 
Party secretaries.”120   
The People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) did little to improve its standing 
with the populace. The government implemented a conscription policy in order to stem 
the growing insurgencies of pro-Sihanouk and former Khmer Rouge forces. Given 
“Certificates of Sacrifice,” all young men between the ages of 17 and 25 were to serve in 
the CPAF for a period of no-less-than five years.121 Utterly counterproductive, the 
measure undermined the effectiveness of the CPAF. Having spent most of their life 
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dodging Vietnamese artillery rounds, Cambodian bullets, and American bombs, most 
Cambodians went to considerable lengths to avoid conscription.122  
In contrast to the conscripted CPAF, several armed groups opposed the 
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Backed to a large extent to the People’s Republic 
of China, the post-RAK National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) was able to 
carry out a fairly effective, and rather far reaching insurgency, against North Vietnamese 
and KPRA forces. Conversely, despite significant financial aid from numerous Southeast 
Asian nations, re-emergent KPNLAF forces were ultimately unable to mount effective 
Thai–Cambodia cross-border operations due to command and control issues.123 Finally, 
the risk-adverse Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS) provided limited direct assistance 
to the KPNLAF.124 Amounting to almost 50,000 personnel, these forces would not begin 
the demobilization process until the latter months of 1991.125 
By the end of the 1990s, Cambodia was less prepared to meet security challenges 
than it had been at the time of independence; most of the RCAF was underequipped, 
absurdly underpaid, and untrained in modern military tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
This force was obviously not the force to represent a nation calling for greater regional 
and international integration. Stern writes,  
The Cambodian military…recognized the need to integrate the lessons of 
defense reforms, develop a new doctrine and modern organizational 
practices, sort out the issues surrounding the emerging need to improve 
maritime security capacity, and commit to multilateral cooperation in this 
and other areas of defense reform.126  
Cambodia’s political–military elite called for reform in order to facilitate institutional 
balancing, improve economic relations, and decrease the cost of what many considered 
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an unnecessary large force. The rank and file of the RCAF loudly called for reform in 
hopes of achieving even minor quality of life improvements. 
New missions began to appear on the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces’ (RCAF) 
task list early in the new millennium. Written in 2000, the nation’s first defense white 
paper included the maintenance of “peace, stability and social security.”127 By 2006, this 
particular task set had expanded to the international arena; the cover of that year’s white 
paper explicitly provides three overarching tasks for the force: security, development, and 
international cooperation.128 What spurred the doctrinal change—from one with an 
internal orientation to one with decidedly external nuances? Moreover, how could a force 
historically used for internal security be re-orientated to meet external security 
cooperation objectives?  
By the time the second white paper went to the presses, the U.S. led “Global War 
on Terror” was in full swing, and developing states found an audience with western 
powers anxious to thwart potential transnational security threats. Speaking at an OXCEL 
Honorary Fellowship awards banquet, PM Hun Sen provided the following context for 
reform:  
While the concepts of the security have gradually changed from national 
security to human security, from common security to cooperative security 
and integration, the roles of the military have more burdens on their 
current duties with new policies in order to respond to the emergent needs 
and threats. All of these required the reformation and renovation in the 
military aimed at providing new and modern skills, operations, [and] 
cooperations [sic] for immediate response.129   
According to Hun Sen, the changing security environment necessitated the reformation of 
the RCAF. Additionally, given the transnational nature of the emerging security threat, 
regional and international security cooperation became a necessary departure from the 
strict neutrality of the past. Tea Banh (2006) writes, “While overcoming complicated 
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obstacles in its reform process, the RCAF is promoting the prestige of the Kingdom of 
Cambodia in the international arena and this is unprecedented in the history of 
Cambodia.”130  
C.  RE-ORIENTING DOCTRINE AND TRAINING 
Reform can be a costly affair. Through the implementation of a somewhat 
discontinuous demobilization program, the military has decreased in overall size from 
over 200,000 uniformed personnel in the mid-1990s to approximately 124,300 personnel 
today.131 However, even this number has been difficult for the government to justify. In 
1996, forces under the command of Ieng Sary were successful in neutralizing a 
significant portion of Khmer Rouge fighters in the vicinity of Pailin.132 Benny Widyono 
continues, “Finally, in 2003, with the death of Pol Pot and the surrender of its remaining 
leaders, the Khmer Rouge movement was finally dissolved.”133  
In the absence of a quantifiable internal security threat, the Royal Cambodian 
Government has had to refocus the RCAF. Cambodia currently spends about $300M 
USD, or 12.5% of its annual budget, on simply sustaining the outmoded force.134 Monies 
for modernization therefore have had to come from outside the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) monitored budget.  
Recalling Sotomayor, “[Peacekeeping] can provide a means to transit from one 
doctrine to another without provoking large budgetary and operational cuts–justifying 
                                                 
130 Tea Banh is referring to the 2006 deployment of Cambodian de-miners in support of United 
Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO) initiatives. Tea Banh, Defense White Paper, Ministry of Defense 
(2006), Introduction.  
131 Of that number, approximately 45,000 personnel serve only in a limited, reserve or “provincial” 
capacity. Taylor and Francis Group, “Chapter Six: Asia,” The Military Balance, Vol. 111, No. 1 (2011), pg. 
229. Available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2011.559837, accessed August 16, 2011.  
132 Benny Widyono, “The Spectre of the Khmer Rouge over Cambodia,” UN Chronicle 45 (2008), 26.  
133 Ibid.  
134 In years prior, Cambodia has earmarked almost twice that number for the military, only to be 
chastised by the IMF. Jane’s, “Defense Budget (Cambodia), Jane’s Online (October 19, 2010). Available 
online at: http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-Southeast-Asia/Defence-
budget-Cambodia.html, accessed August 25, 2011.  
 39 
some levels of expenditure at a time when imminent internal security threats are 
eroding.”135 Cambodia quickly turned to peacekeeping as a means of re-orientating the 
force; with-in months of the destruction of the Khmer Rouge, RCAF officers deployed as 
United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) to the United Nations Mission in Sudan.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Cambodia’s Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN-PKO from   April 
2001 through June 2011.136  
Cambodia began to play a more active role in the promotion of peacekeeping as a 
means of reform in early 2009. In June of that year, near the ruins of Angkor Wat, it 
hosted the 3rd ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Peacekeeping Experts’ Meeting. Co-
chaired by LTG Nem Sowath and the Japanese Ministry of Defense Director General of 
International Affairs Mr. Hiroshi Oe, several presentations were given under the banner 
of “Enhancing the Regional Capacity to Participate in United Nations Peacekeeping 
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Operations.”137 The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM)’s Global Peace 
Operations Initiative (GPOI) brief, as well as the People’s Republic of China’s overview 
of its new Peacekeeping Training Center, highlighted an emerging dynamic in the 
region.138 In fact, one entire session of the 2009 ARF was devoted to peacekeeping 
training centers, which included presentations on the International Association of Peace 
Training Centers (IAPTC), as well as the Malaysian Peacekeeping Training Centre 
(MPTC) and the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK).139  
In keeping with this global trend, and with considerable U.S. financial aid, 
Cambodia opened its own peacekeeping training center on May 3, 2010.  Completed 
largely by Cambodian laborers, “on time, within scope, and to the agreed standards,” this 
$1,800,000 USD facility, located in Kampong Speu Province, is designed to facilitate 
approximately 675 personnel.140 However, due to budgetary constraints, utilities such as 
water and electricity are provided only when other nations send troops to the site in 
support of either bi-later or multi-lateral training exercises.  
The opening of the peacekeeping training center brought with it significant 
controversy, with the loudest opposition coming from Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
staffers.  HRW Deputy Asia Director Phil Robertson is quoted as saying, “For the [U.S. 
Department of Defense] Pentagon and [U.S.] State Department to approve construction 
of facilities for a high-profile regional peacekeeping exercise at the base of an abusive 
Cambodian military unit—whether it subsequently changed names or not—is 
                                                 
137 Notably, Deputy Prime Minister H.E. Prak Sokhonn provided the opening remarks, citing 
Cambodia’s transformation from a nation with a U.N. mission to a nation supporting other missions abroad. 
ASEAN Secretariat, “Co-Chairs Summary Report of the 3rd ARF Peacekeeping Experts’ Meeting,” 
ASEAN Regional Forum (June 26, 2009). Available online at: 
http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/tabid/66/Default.a
asp, accessed September 15, 2010. 
138 ASEAN, “Co-Chairs Summary Report.”    
139 Ibid.  
140 Theodore Allegra, “Remarks by Charge D’Affaires Theodore Allegra at the Opening of 
Peacekeeping Training Center ,” Embassy of the United States in Cambodia (May 3, 2010). Available 
online at: http://cambodia.usembassy.gov/sp_050310.html, accessed September 16, 2010. 
 41 
outrageous.”141 Robertson continues, “The U.S. undermines its protests against the 
Cambodian government for rampant rights abuses like forced evictions when it showers 
international attention and funds on military units involved in grabbing land and other 
human rights violations.”142 Those sentiments were echoed by Asia Times contributor 
Clifford McCoy,  
In a July 8 report, Human Rights Watch (HRW), a [U.S.]-based rights 
lobby, alleged that many RCAF units selected to participate in the 
[concurrently held exercise ANGKOR SENTINEL 2010] had abysmal 
[human] rights records. HRW said that by allowing the controversial units 
to participate in the drills, the U.S. had undermined its own commitment 
to the promotion of human rights in Cambodia.143  
Both United States and Cambodian officials were quick to dismiss allegations of 
corruption. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s visit to the Kingdom in late 
2010 “[highlighted] the United States commitment to enhanced, sustained, and 
comprehensive engagement in Southeast Asia, as well as [the United States’] desire to 
assist the Cambodian people in their efforts to recover fully from decades of conflict, to 
achieve political and legal reforms, and to strengthen economic development.”144 
Moreover, in 2010, the United States provided over $70 million USD in financial aid to 
the nation.145 Increasingly, Washington has come to view the Kingdom as an important 
ally in regional counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism operations.   
Held at a considerable distance from Phnom Penh, ANGKOR SENTINEL 2011 
garnered far less attention than the previous year’s exercise. The significantly scaled 
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down Command Post Exercise (CPX) focused on the role of a battalion level contingent 
staff operating in a United Nations peacekeeping mission. Alongside Utah Army National 
Guard soldiers, and under the guidance of Center for Civil–Military Relations instructors 
and active duty military Naval Postgraduate School students, amalgamated RCAF staffs 
conducted multiple planning exercises, mock civil–military liaison meetings, and press 
conferences.  
D.  THE RCAF AND UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
Generally, Cambodian peacekeepers have been employed in roles which “are 
compatible with their dual [internal–external] doctrine.”146 Specifically, RCAF officers 
and engineers have been deployed in small numbers in support of the United Nations 
Mission in Sudan / South Sudan (UNMIS / UNMISS), as well as the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In even smaller numbers, RCAF personnel have 
been sent in support of United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad 
(MINURCAT).  
RCAF engineers in Sudan / South Sudan have garnered several accolades. The 
Director of the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) in Khartoum, Nigel Forrestal, recently 
sent a letter of appreciation to LTG Sem Sovanny, stating,  
We were particularly impressed with the RCAF remote deployment to the 
Maban where the team destroyed over 900 UXO, 3 AP [anti-personnel] 
and 4 AT [anti-tank] mines, including 1 AT mine which was found in the 
middle of the village. We understand that of the 50 RCAF engineers in 
Sudan deployed to Maban for an extended period; this is a commendable 
effort.147  
Forrestal continues, “It was with great pleasure I read about RCAF being accredited by 
the CMAA [Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Authority] to carryout operations 
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within Cambodia. I believe this is a huge step forward to tackle issues of landmines and 
UXOs in your country, and I send my congratulations.”148 Irwin Loy writes,  
Cambodia is one of the most contaminated countries in the world when it 
comes to land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). But with almost 
two decades of experience slowly cleaning away that legacy from 
contaminated rice fields and jungle brush across the country, Cambodian 
authorities have also become reluctant experts. They are now hoping to 
use that expertise to help other developing countries afflicted with similar 
problems.149 
The recent deployment of approximately two hundred RCAF engineers to 
Lebanon is notable for a couple of reasons; (1) the RCAF has attained a notable level of 
proficiency in large scale demining operations, and (2) indicates that the RCAF is willing 
to assume a greater role in peacekeeping operations. United Nations Resident 
Coordinator in Cambodia Douglas Broderick highlighted the significant milestone in 
remarks given at the November 2010 Departure Ceremony held for Cambodian Field 
Engineering Contingent 513, “[This deployment] represents an important step forward in 
Cambodia’s transition from a recipient country of peacekeepers to one that deploys 
highly skilled experts to assist in other countries where the need is great.”150  
E.  CONCLUSION 
Fifty years of continues conflict, beginning in 1945, essentially stunted the 
RCAF’s development as an effective fighting force. However, fifteen years of peace have 
allowed Cambodia to implement security sector reform measures, and begin to re-
orientate the military from an internal to a more external military doctrine. The intangible 
dividends of five years of peacekeeping have yet to be fully witnessed.   
                                                 
148 Forrestal, “RCAF Appreciation Letter.” 
149 Irwin Loy, “Development: Cambodian Deminers Now Train Others,” Global Information Network 
(October 26, 2010).  
150 Douglas Broderick, “Speech at the Departure of Cambodian Troops to Join UN Mission in 
Lebanon,” The United Nations in Cambodia (November 17, 2010). Available online at: 
http://www.un.org.kh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=393:the-un-resident-coordinator-
speech-at-the-departure-of-cambodian-troops-to-join-un-mission-in-lebanon&catid=44:un-speeches-and-
statements&Itemid=77, accessed August 25, 2011.  
 44 
One cannot dismiss the financial aspects of peacekeeping. As a nation, Cambodia 
is only assessed .003%, or approximately $210,000 USD, of the total peacekeeping 
budget.151 Conversely, Cambodia receives a payment of approximately $1,208 USD per 
month for each soldier deployed in direct support of a peacekeeping mission.152 Given 
Cambodia’s current contribution of approximately 269 troops, the nation is reimbursed 
somewhere in the order of $325,000 USD per month, or nearly $4M USD per year. This 
may not sound like a lot, but for politically appointed officers with salaries of less than 
$350 USD per month, access to peacekeeping funds could prove highly lucrative.153  
While it has demonstrated a high degree of proficiency in demining, the RCAF 
has yet to prove its ability as a battalion-sized actor in an integrated, robust peacekeeping 
operation. Battalion level operations, particularly in peace operations, require a proficient 
battalion staff; however, the established political–military patronage system makes the 
formation of an operationally proficient battalion staff highly unlikely. As Pamela Sodhy 
writes, “the main difficulty [is] changing Cambodia’s military from an essentially money 
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IV. IN COMPARISON: THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND 
THE TNI 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This comparison chapter will briefly examine the role of the Republic of 
Indonesia’s Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) in UN-PKO. First, this chapter will 
provide a short historical survey of Indonesia’s political and security environment. 
Second, this chapter will explore the contemporary TNI’s role in UN-PKO. Finally, this 
chapter will offer a comparison of the TNI and the RCAF with the aim of explaining the 
level of participation gap. In accordance with Kai He’s “institutional balancing” model, 
both the Kingdom of Cambodia and the  Republic of Indonesia promote participation in 
UN-PKO as a means of garnering international prestige points, and thereby gaining 
greater access to regional and international organizations. However, because Indonesia 
has been able to implement an effective military reform program across a broader section 
of its military, it has been able to increase its participation level at a much higher rate 
than that of Cambodia.     
B.  A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INDONESIA’S POLITICAL–
MILITARY ENVIRONMENT 
As with Cambodia, early Indonesian politics during the immediate post-
independence period were shaped by colonial legacies, and domestic tensions. However, 
unlike the French in Cambodia, the returning Dutch in Indonesia almost immediately 
faced considerable, well-organized, and openly belligerent opposition. Dutch forces, still 
crippled from the recent global conflict, attempted to re-establish control on an ethnically 
diverse archipelago stretching thousands of miles; however, success proved fleeting. 
Jacques Bertrand writes, “The armed struggle with interspersed with cease-fire 
agreements that specified various political arrangements and divided territories under 
Dutch or Republican control. None of the agreements ever had time to be implemented 
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when the armed conflict resumed.”155 Just as the Cambodian elite no longer desired to 
part of the French colonial system, Indonesia’s elite espoused nationalist views, and 
looked to unite the various islands under one banner. One man, above all others, would 
become the ensign bearer.  
Cambodia had Sihanouk, and Indonesia had Sukarno. Likewise, just as Sihanouk 
turned to the FARK to establish an independent Cambodia, Sukarno looked to the 
fledgling military in the immediate post-independence period.  Bertrand writes, “Sukarno 
and the armed forces chose strong-arm tactics to secure the unity of the nation, stability 
of the state, and resolution of fundamental questions about Indonesia’s national 
model.”156 However, while the nation may have been unified under one banner, national 
stability proved elusive. By the early 1950s, Sukarno faced open dissent from proponents 
of the Darul Islam movement in the provinces of Aceh, Sumatra, and Sulawesi.157 In fact, 
a momentary separatist government was formed in early months of 1958.158  
Ultimately, Sukarno’s reliance on violence to achieve national stability would 
prove to be his downfall. His relationships with military officers eventually led to rumors 
of favoritism, thereby isolating important (and armed) factions. As Adrian Vickers writes, 
“The egalitarianism of revolutionary brotherhood had been replaced by the feudal 
hierarchies that such progressives were meant to overthrow.”159 Sukarno was ultimately 
deposed by the one man not explicitly targeted in the infamous September 30, 1965, 
coup—Major General Suharto.  
The Suharto period is one marked by economic progress, as well as notable 
domestic social unrest. Widespread corruption brought various elements of the Suharto 
government into direct conflict with numerous disenfranchised groups, including the 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in the Sumatran province of Aceh, the Free Papua 
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Movement (OPM) in the province of Irian Jaya, and the Fretilin in East Timor. In the 
same vane as the Hun Sen rhetoric of the post-UNTAC period, dissents were viewed by 
the Suharto regime as enemies of the state. Vickers writes, “The nation was seen as one 
big family, where there should be no signs of dissent to the benevolent patriarch.”160 
Under Suharto’s authorization, the TNI spent decades conducting costly offensive 
operations against various dissidents in the hinterlands of the archipelago.  
Suharto ultimately succumbed to a burgeoning middle class. Vickers writes,  
As Suharto’s grip on power became more monolithic, the growing middle 
class felt they were prevented from making decisions about their lives. 
Displays of feudal-style paternalism and sham elections were no longer 
enough, they wanted real democracy.161  
The empowered masses were no longer willing to accept “authoritarianism…as the price 
the country paid for development.”162 Following large-scale protests, spurred to some 
degree by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Suharto stepped down from power.   
Indonesia experienced a succession of presidents through-out early 2000s. 
Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie held power for only seventeen months, from May 1998 to 
October 1999, before being replaced by Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahid retained power for 
only twenty months before being replaced by Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, in late July 2001. Finally, another former military commander, President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was elected to office in October of 2004.   
Unlike many of the previous heads-of-state, President Yudhoyono has placed a 
greater emphasis on the development of vital national and regional institutions. 
Yudhoyono places his understanding of the greater social - political environment in the 
following historical context: 
One of the reasons our democracy has worked derives from a hard lesson 
from our past: the need to build a future that focuses on institutions and 
rules, not personalities. History, of course, is full of great men and women. 
But political systems that depend upon the force of individual personalities 
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will find it increasingly hard to sustain themselves. As we twice 
experienced in Indonesia, when a strong personality fell from power, the 
entire system crumbled with him because the system was simply a mirror 
image of the leader. Thus I would prefer to define strong leaders as those 
who are able to develop a durable system.163 
Referring to the Sukarno and Suharto regimes, Yudhoyono’s remarks highlight the 
dangers of personal / popular politics, and the effect of regime change on insecure 
national institutions. Yudhoyono has aggressively sought institutional reform since his 
time in the military.  
As a former TNI commander, President Yudhoyono has also been one of the more 
vocal proponents of military reform. John B. Haseman writes, “In charge of the social 
and political affairs at the time, then Lieutenant General Yudhoyono was a principal 
architect of the New Paradigm (Paradigma Baru), the formal military doctrine that 
replaced [Dual Function] dwi-fungsa.”164 Under Paradigma Baru, and in stark contrast to 
the RCAF in Cambodia, “the TNI has withdrawn, as an institution, from day-to-day 
political activities.”165 No longer are Indonesian military commanders focused almost 
exclusively on domestic (and largely political) matters; instead, they have been able to 
explore more cosmopolitan roles for the nation’s armed forces.  
C. THE TNI AND UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS  
The Republic of Indonesia actually has a long, albeit erratic history of 
participation in UN-PKO. Indonesian peacekeepers were among the rank and file of both 
United Nations Emergency Force missions (UNEF I / UNEF II).166 In fact, Lieutenant 
General (Retired) Rais Abin served as UNEF II Force Commander from December 1976 
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till the mission’s closing in September 1979.167 Such deployments, as well as Indonesia’s 
current participation in UNIFIL, have largely been attributed to the nation’s desire to 
establish itself as an indispensible intermediary between the East and West. Eduardo 
Lachica writes, “[Indonesia] offers its services as a trusted mediator between the Muslim 
world and the West. It offers a secular rather than an Islamic solution. This is entirely 
consistent with Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy, which has been studiedly 
‘nonaligned’….”168 Interestingly, in all of these deployments, the utilization of 
Indonesian peacekeepers has been, and continues to be, publicly criticized by Israeli 
diplomats, since Israel and Indonesia have yet to normalize relations.  
Indonesian peacekeepers have also been used as a tool for conflict mediation on 
the Asian mainland. As Indonesia co-chaired the 1990 Paris Conference, Indonesian 
peacekeepers were some of the first to arrive in immediate post-conflict Cambodia. 
Indonesia maintained a battalion of troops in the national capitol, as well as exercised 
sector control over an area roughly corresponding to the borders of Kampong Thom 
Province.169  However, Indonesian troops were widely criticized for failing to adhere to 
the directives of the Canadian force commander, and Japanese Special Representative to 
the Secretary General.  
Since their sojourns to Cambodia, Indonesian peacekeepers have been able to 
demonstrate a general improvement in peacekeeping capacity. This is likely due to the 
methods of security sector reform implemented by President Yudhoyono. As previously 
stated, military commanders are no longer bound by Dwi-Fungsa. Moreover, Indonesian 
leaders have been able to re-establish relationships with their regional and international 
counterparts. After a decade long hiatus, the annual United States–Indonesia military 
peace operations exercise GARUDA SHIELD was reinstituted in mid-2007.170   
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The Indonesian military’s focus on multi-lateral peace operations is indicative of 
a shift in military doctrine. The TNI is no longer being used to violently achieve domestic 
stability; instead, the force is being used in some measure to achieve stability abroad. 
However, it is being asked by former military and civilian leaders to do so under 
significant budgetary constraints. Recalling Sotomayor, participation in peacekeeping 
allows the force to transition from an internally focused to an externally focus military 
doctrine at minimal cost.   
 
 
Figure 2.   Indonesia’s Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN-PKO from April 
2001 through June 2011.171  
Indonesia began to reinstate peacekeeping as a viable mission for the TNI in late 
2003, with the deployment of approximately one hundred and fifty personnel to MONUC 
(now MONUSCO).  These personnel, predominately engineers, now work alongside 
Indian, Bangladeshi, and Moroccan peacekeepers in and around Dungu, Province 
Oriental.172  
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The most notable deployment of TNI personnel to a peacekeeping mission came 
in late 2006, with the deployment of over nine hundred personnel to UNIFIL. Since 2009, 
the TNI has significantly expanded its role in UNIFIL. As of June 2011, there were over 
1,353 TNI personnel serving in the mission, including twenty-three female troops.173 
Specific roles for GARUDA contingent include company–level activities at the force 
headquarters in Naquora, and military police duties alongside the Cambodian engineers 
in the most northern sector of the mission, as well as battalion-level activities in the 
vicinity of UNIFIL Post 7–1 near At Tayyabah.174  
D.  CONCLUSION 
The Tentara Nasional Indonesia and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces share 
many commonalities: (1) both were historically used to suppress social unrest; (2) both 
turned to extramural economic activities to make up for budget shortfalls; (3) both have 
been viewed by politicians as tools for garnering international prestige points; and finally 
(4) both are currently the object of military reform efforts. It is the author’s contention 
that the latter two points explain why both nations are actively participating in 
contemporary United Nations lead peacekeeping operations.  
However, the dissimilarities between the Tentara Nasional Indonesia and the 
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces might explain why the TNI is far active in peacekeeping 
than the RCAF: (1) whereas the armed forces of Cambodia were dragged into the broader 
Cold War conflict, the armed forces of Indonesia generally were not; (2)  likewise, while 
Cambodian political-military leaders pitted indigenous forces against one-another 
through-out the 1970s and 1980s, Indonesian commanders largely kept their troops 
devoted to more economic endeavors; and finally, (3) whereas current RCAF 
commanders are currently active in the CPP, active duty TNI commanders have generally 
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withdrawn from politics. Simply put, Cambodian forces are prohibited from assuming a 
more active role in peacekeeping by the domestic social–political entanglements of their 
leaders.  
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V.  IN CONCLUSION 
A.  LOOKING AT THE HYPOTHESES 
1. Hypothesis 1: The RCG authorizes peacekeeping in order to conform to 
expectations of nation-state behavior.  
The first hypothesis is also the least likely explanation for why the RCG sends 
RCAF peacekeepers abroad. The RCG largely discounts the potential penalties for failing 
to conform to expected norms of nation-state behavior.175 With-in the last year, the 
Kingdom has come to figurative blows with the United Nations regarding human rights 
and rule-of-law issues. The RCG has repeatedly threatened to expel the head of the 
United Nations Office of Human Rights in Phnom Penh.176 Furthermore, The United 
Nations Council on Human Rights’ “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Cambodia,” released in September 2010, was met with widespread 
condemnation by the Hun Sen regime.177  
The future of the United Nations-backed Khmer Rouge tribunals also remains 
uncertain. Seth Mydans provides the following commentary:  
Political and legal analysts say the [RCG] investigators’ stance casts a 
shadow over a tribunal that had been intended among other things to 
demonstrate the workings of a legal system untainted by politics and the 
official impunity that has been common in Cambodia. The investigators’ 
actions conform with the frequently and forcefully stated view of Prime 
Minister Hun Sen that two trials were enough and that, as he told the U.N. 
secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, last October, Case Three was “not 
allowed.”178  
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Heder writes,  
U.N. frictions were dramatized during an October 2010 meeting between 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Hun Sen, who reiterated his 
opposition to [Khmer Rouge Tribunal] Cases 003 and 004 and demanded 
the removal of the head of the U.N. human rights office in Cambodia.”179 
Heder concludes, “At year’s end, the future of that office and of Cases 003 
and 004 remained uncertain, but Hun Sen’s determination to further 
neutralize U.N. agencies was clear.180  
 Given the recent actions of the RCG, and particularly those actions it has taken 
towards the United Nations, it is unlikely that it authorizes the deployment of RCAF 
peacekeepers in order to conform to expectations of state behavior.   
 
2. Hypothesis 2: The RCG promotes peacekeeping as a means of improving its 
position in regional and international organizations. 
This hypothesis seems plausible. Peacekeeping remains a laudable endeavor. In 
the short-term, nominal demonstrations of support for international peace initiatives may 
allow the RCG to mitigate donor criticism of its less-than-exemplary human rights 
record. Over the long-term, peacekeeping may even affect change with-in the military, 
and particularly among the officer corps. Haseman writes,  
Professional military education that incorporates the latest principles of 
human rights, military operations in civilian environments, and civil–
military relations cannot help but reduce the incidence of abuses and meet 
the demands of [military] reformists who want to see more acceptable 
behavior by the military become the norm.181  
What makes this hypothesis only plausible for Cambodia, and not probable, is the 
fact the Kingdom has deployed peacekeepers at a much lower rate compared to other 
Southeast Asian nations.  An examination of United Nations monthly troop contributions 
from early 2001 to mid-2011 reveals the disparity between the two nations examined in 
this thesis (i.e., Cambodia and Indonesia).  
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Figure 3.   ASEAN Member-state Contributions to UN-PKO from April 2001 to June 
2011.182 
 If Cambodia looked to improve its position in either regional or international 
organizations, it would demonstrate a level of commitment either at or above its 
theoretical competitors. Moreover, Indonesia’s level of participation does indeed seem to 
reflect President Yudhoyono’s desire for Indonesia to assume a more prominent role in 
world politics.  
 
3. Hypothesis 3: The RCG looks to peacekeeping as a means of affecting military 
reform.  
This hypothesis is the most probable explanation for why the RCG authorizes the 
deployment of peacekeepers abroad. The current government openly looks to modernize 
the RCAF, yet is constrained by an economy largely dependent on international foreign 
aid. Cambodian de-miners have gained invaluable field experience in UNMIS / 
UNMISS, as well as UNIFIL. Furthermore, under the banner of improving its peace 
operations capacity, the RCG has been able to reinvigorate bilateral military relations 
with the United States, as well as the People’s Republic of China, and as a result receives 
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a significant amount of peace operations training and sundry materiel from both 
powers.183   
The importance of peacekeeping as a new mission for the RCAF cannot be 
understated. The RCG, and more succinctly the CPP, is dominated by former military 
officers; however, effective command and control of the RCAF has, to some degree, been 
lost as individuals have transitioned from military to civilian administrative positions. By 
giving the military an external orientation (i.e., from internal security to international 
stability), generals-cum-politicians have been able to retain control of their forces. As 
Michael C. Desch writes, “External orientation is a necessary, though not always 
sufficient, condition for firm civilian control of the military.”184  
B.  LOOKING AT CAMBODIA’S NEIGHBORS 
1. The Kingdom of Thailand 
Thailand is a good example of a nation faced with a mix of internal and external 
security threats. Internally, Thailand struggles to suppress an insurgency simmering in its 
southern provinces. Externally, it continually finds itself confronting trans-national 
issues. Notably, it continues to come to literal blows with Cambodia concerning the 
Preah Vihear Temple.  
The Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) is hesitant to deploy anything more than 
a battalion-sized contingent to a single United Nations-led peacekeeping operation. 
Senior RTARF officers remain fearful of the potential loss of life often associated with 
modern peace enforcement operations.185  Furthermore, they are skeptical of the value of 
sending infantry units for peacekeeping; however, they have acknowledge the potential 
for either an engineering or medical unit (of any size) to gain valuable experience in 
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peace operations.186 Currently, the Kingdom of Thailand has only one troop contingent 
battalion serving in a United Nations mission–the African Union / United Nations Hybrid 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).187   
2.  The Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
Vietnam and Cambodia have far more in the common than either is probably 
willing to admit. Both nations have sustained economic growth levels of approximately 
7%.188 Additionally, both nations have come under increasingly severe criticism of their 
less-than-stellar human rights records.189 Finally, both nations have begun to view 
peacekeeping as a common ground for initiating bilateral dialogue for important regional 
and international economic partners (namely, the United States), and for affecting 
military reform.   
Vietnam began to explore the possibility of peacekeeping just prior to assuming 
chairmanship of ASEAN.190 As Chair, the nation hosted several key events, including the 
First ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting-Plus (ADMM+). While Vietnam may face a 
slightly menacing external security threat, it faces almost no internal threats, and is likely 
to deploy a limited contingent of peacekeepers in the very near future.   
3.  Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
The similarities between Cambodia and Laos are readily apparent. Politically, 
Laos is dominated by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, which as of 2010 held 113 
of the 115 available seats in the National Assembly.191 Furthermore, significant 
corruption and a deplorable human rights record limit foreign direct investment. 
                                                 
186 Interviews conducted by the author, with several senior RTARF military officials, in July 2011. 
187 United Nations, “United Nations Mission Summary Detailed by Country,” (August 31, 2011) 
Available online at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/aug11_3.pdf, accessed 
September 24, 2011.  
188 Ramses Amer, “Vietnam in 2010,” Asian Survey 51 (January / February 2011): 196.  
189 Ibid., 198.   
190 Asian-Pacific Center for Security Studies, “Workshop Focuses on Peacekeeping Options, 
Challenges,” (April 10, 2009). Available online at: http://www.apcss.org/workshop-focuses-on-un-
peacekeeping-options-challenges/, accessed September 24, 2011.  
191 William Case, “Laos in 2010,” Asian Survey 51 (January / February 2011): 202.   
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However, the nation has ambitiously set its sights on broadening its economic base, and 
achieving greater stature in regional and international organizations.192  
In the near-term, Laos is probably the least likely of Cambodia’s neighbors to 
deploy troops in support of peace operations. This is simply due to the severely limited 
capacity of the Lao People’s Army (LPA). Moreover, the LPAF is hobbled in engaging in 
externally oriented operations by an internally orientated security doctrine. The United 
States Central Intelligence Agency provides the following synopsis:  
its mission focus is border and internal security, primarily in countering 
ethnic Hmong insurgent groups; together with the Lao People's 
Revolutionary Party and the government, the Lao People's Army (LPA) is 
the third pillar of state machinery, and as such is expected to suppress 
political and civil unrest and similar national emergencies.193  
Even a minor change to Laos’ doctrine security would pay huge dividends. Such a 
change to Cambodia’s doctrine facilitated the near-term deployment of engineers to 
UNMIS; these engineers have gone on to form the core of Cambodia’s military demining 
efforts. Laos could easily improve its demining capacity by authorizing the deployment 
of even limited numbers of LPAF engineers to well-established United Nations missions. 
In fact, as is the case with Cambodia, it might even do so with financial profit.    
C.  LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
This thesis began by stating that the largest troop contributors to current United 
Nations operations will be unable to sustain their commitments levels in the years to 
come. This examination of the Kingdom of Cambodia’s reasons for participation in UN-
PKO has revealed a few potential incentives for other Southeast Asian states to either 
engage in, or escalate their level of participation in, peace operations. Peacekeeping 
allows for states to efficiently affect reform across select cross-sections of their militaries. 
Furthermore, peacekeeping allows for militaries to improve their interoperability with 
regional and international partners. Finally, as demonstrated in the case of Indonesia, 
                                                 
192 Case, “Laos in 2010,” 204-205.   
193 United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Laos,” The World Factbook (August 23, 2011), 
Available online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/la.html, accessed 
September 24, 2011.  
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peacekeeping allows states to signal their commitment to international initiatives, thereby 
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